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Abstract
The article covers journalism-related crimes as a relatively distinct category of offences. The 
importance and purpose of isolating the concept of journalistic criminality under conditions of 
globalization in the modern theory of legal thought, the rapid development of the information 
society, and the embodied increase of the role of information and knowledge in human life are 
emphasized. Attention is paid to the factors affecting the dynamics and development of crimes 
in the area of professional activities of journalists, which primarily includes the environment of 
hybrid war. The destructive impact of the social consequences of journalistic crimes on society is 
evident in the case of Ukraine, which has suffered in the past and to this day experiences the latest 
information manifestations of hybrid war. The proposition to criminalize the intentional spreading 
of false information in the media by journalists is discussed. The reasons, basis and conditions for 
such criminalization are analysed. The existence of criminalization grounds for such an offence 
is substantiated in the article. However, conclusions are drawn on the inappropriateness of such 
criminalization due to its non-correspondence with certain conditions associated with difficulties in 
adjudication and with the problem of proving this type of behaviour. Other means of counteracting 
the deliberate dissemination of false information are considered.
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Introduction
The theoretical importance of the concept of hybrid war has been 
increasing within the modern political and legal discourse. The term 
is usually used to refer to a specific phenomenon that has become 
common in the world over the past decades. This phenomenon covers 
a complexity of classical methods of warfare, the exercise of military 
aggression (involving regular and irregular military formations), and 
new technologies, especially those related to the powerful information 
influence of the enemy and its allies.
Countries that face hybrid war often become vulnerable in various areas 
of social and political life. Special attention should be drawn, among other 
things, to the implementation of policies against crime, which, under such 
circumstances, are forced to undergo transformation due to the influence 
of some uncommon factors. The issue is about the appearance of new 
types of criminal behaviour and their proper legal analyses, about the 
issue of strengthening the repressive component of criminal law without 
violating its basic principles, and about the search for new and more 
effective or adequate criminal law measures.
It seems that the global scientific community should concentrate its efforts 
on finding successful ways to counter hybrid war by using the positive 
and negative experiences of those countries that have faced a similar 
phenomenon before. Ukraine is one of them: it has experienced all modern 
forms and methods of fighting a hybrid war with the Russian Federation. 
As is known, the active (open) phase of the war began in March 2014 with 
the annexation of Crimea, then continued with the seizure of parts of the 
territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. It is still going on.
The Ukrainian experience of combatting some of the modern 
manifestations of hybrid warfare might be interesting in different ways, but 
among those that are key is the emergence and development of new 
types of socially dangerous behaviour, and the acquisition of atypical 
features through such crimes. These include criminality in the area of 
journalism, which requires independent scientific review, thus allowing us 
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to thoroughly analyse the status of a journalist within the focus of criminal 
law theory and practice.
In Ukraine, the status of a journalist is determined by Art. 1 of the Law of 
Ukraine on State Support to Mass Media and Social Protection of Journalists 
from 23 September 1997, according to which a journalist is a creative 
worker who professionally collects, receives, creates and engages in 
the preparation of information for the media, and performs editorial and 
official duties in the media (within the staff or on a freelance basis). A 
similar approach is reflected in Recommendation No. R (2000) 7, On the 
Right of Journalists not to Disclose their Sources of Information, adopted 
by the Committee of Ministers on 8 March 2000 at the 701st Meeting of 
Deputy Ministers, which states that the term “journalist” means any natural 
or legal person who is regularly or professionally involved in collecting and 
publicly disseminating information through any medium (CE 2000).
Thus, a journalist is someone who regularly works with information for the 
media, and whose main function is to work on collecting, processing 
and creating information for the media. The criminal law aspects of such 
activity are emphasized in this article.
In view of all the above, the purpose of this article is to study the 
phenomenon of crimes committed by journalists in the course of their 
professional activities, as well as crimes committed against journalists 
(when the journalist becomes a crime victim). One of the manifestations 
of this phenomenon is found in Ukraine, which remains in the hybrid war 
environment to this day.
The structure of the article allows primary consideration of the specifics in 
modern manifestations of hybrid war with an emphasis on its information 
component. Furthermore, the place of journalistic crime among other 
types of crime is demonstrated and its ability to be enforced under the 
influence of modern hybrid war factors is underlined. The following section 
refers to the criminal law limitations on the freedom of speech, followed 
by those issues surrounding a journalist as a potential crime perpetrator 
associated with the dissemination of knowingly false information. The last 
section accumulates key aspects of the discussed issues, forms conclusions 
and outlines potential directions for further research.
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Hybrid war and its information component
Recently, issues arising from hybrid war have been penetrating deeper into 
the scientific matter of political and legal studies. Study of its components, 
new types and means of warfare, and analysis of the gained experience 
in combating contemporary manifestations of hybrid warfare naturally 
form the agenda for many scientists in law and politics.
Understanding this phenomenon remains ambiguous in modern 
international law; however, experts agree that hybrid war is the newest 
type of war, in which the conflict involves various means of attack and 
defence going beyond the conventionally defined options and types 
of warfare. Researchers provide a list of possible real weapons that can 
be used by the parties. The definition of weapons in this case includes 
not only traditional types of weapon, but also model organizational and 
information types of weapons (Vlasiuk and Karman 2015: 232).
Political scientists also refer to the significance of the information 
component of hybrid war. They argue that the specifics of the armed 
conflict—the place and role of the military argument in politics—are largely 
determined by the degree of societal development and technological 
advancement. Simultaneously, the informative society creates essential 
forms of resistance, and such resistance does not necessarily have to be 
armed or open (Mahda 2014).
Hybrid war usually involves a combination of classic warfare and the use 
of irregular armed groups. According to the former security adviser to 
the UN and NATO General Frank van Kappen, “the state, which leads 
hybrid war, making a deal with non-state performers by the militants, local 
groups, organizations, the relationship is formally denied. These performers 
can do things that the state itself cannot do, because any state is obliged 
to follow the Geneva Convention and the Hague Convention on the laws 
of war on land, the agreements with other countries. All the dirty work can 
be shifted on shoulders of non-state groups” (CSAF 2014).
A bright example of such a hybrid course of war, in which a more militarily 
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powerful aggressor state negotiates with non-government performers 
- groups of local people and militants with whom it denies any formal 
affiliation - is the Russian activity in Ukraine from 2014 to the present. At the 
beginning of the conflict, certain groups of Russian soldiers organized and 
coordinated armed volunteer detachments with the local population 
members in Eastern Ukraine, thus avoiding, to a certain point, direct entry 
of its troops over the Ukrainian border. Such a move allowed Russia to 
partially bypass international law related to warfare principles. Yevhen 
Mahda points out that hybrid warfare in Ukraine has not only revealed 
weak parts of the Ukrainian army and society, but has also articulated a 
new challenge to the world in general and to Eastern European countries 
in particular. The absence of open confrontation, the use of new tactics, 
misinformation, creating an atmosphere of panic and threats for a short 
period of time, and the use of human shields have all demonstrated the 
army’s helplessness in this new type of war (Mahda 2014).
New information tactics in Ukraine related to the aggressive use of 
the media to manipulate public opinion have become particularly 
threatening. There is no doubt that appropriate conditions for further 
military confrontation and for masking external manifestations of 
aggression have been created with their help. According to Horbulin, 
there was not just enemy propaganda taking place in the Ukrainian 
scenario, but also a “war of meanings/senses” (the beginning of which 
could be related to the period of 2006–2007). The whole multiplicity of 
information channels has been involved to retransmit these senses. The 
main structural elements in such war are simulacra-images of something 
that does not exist in reality. The strategic goal of exploiting simulacra 
is to replace objective perceptions of target groups about the nature 
of conflict with the “information phantoms” that the aggressor needs 
(Horbulin 2014: 9).
For the time being, despite the fact that the Russian leadership has 
officially denied any involvement in the crimes committed in Ukraine, the 
intervention of the Russian Federation in Ukrainian politics, as well as its 
aggressive actions on Ukrainian territory, have received adequate legal 
assessment both at the highest levels of Ukrainian government as well as in 
the arenas of foreign and international policy. Positioning Russian armed 
forces in the territory of Ukraine in violation of national and international 
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legal acts has been correctly recognized as partial occupation of the 
sovereign Ukrainian territory (UP 2014; UP 2015; PA 2015; UN 2014).
Russia uses many techniques in its hybrid war against Ukraine, but the major 
one is its information war (NR 2014). The roots of Russia’s hybrid methods 
go back to the Soviet era, although the label is more recent. “Active 
measures”, as hybrid warfare was called back then—such as spreading 
disinformation—was an integral part of Soviet foreign policy. Today, 
some of Russia’s tactics are surprisingly similar, but the current information 
environment makes their use both more efficient and complex (NR 2017).
For example, “Russia’s use of broadcasting tools for propaganda and 
psychological operations, part of a broader information campaign to 
support the Crimean annexation, caught both Ukraine and the West by 
surprise. … The information warfare campaign in Ukraine entailed concerted 
use of Russian state-controlled media” (Kofman and Rojansky 2015: 5).
The aggressor carried out the same activities in the separate districts of 
Donetsk and Luhansk. However, due to the difficulties of implementing the 
Crimean scenario in Donbass, the occupational forces resorted to stricter 
and more violent counterattacks in the pro-Ukrainian information sphere. 
Kidnappings and arrests of journalists, activists, streamers and bloggers took 
place in order to prevent the circulation of an alternative media picture from 
the occupied territories. In addition, like in Crimea, there were numerous 
examples of changing sides by employees of TV and radio companies that 
were seized by Russians. Later on, the same employees started working for 
the new media created by the Russian terrorist forces. Starting in summer 
2014, the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and “Luhansk People’s Republic” 
(with the participation of Russian advisors) began converting the media 
space of the territories into an “information ghetto” where there was no 
chance of seeing or hearing an alternative perspective or receiving true 
coverage of events (Horbulin 2017a: 42).
As the researchers rightly point out, the use of misinformation could be the 
most effective means of hybrid warfare: “misinformation and propaganda 
are being used to complement the overall Russian-integrated approach 
to hybrid warfare. Russia uses the media, for example, Russia Today, Sputnik 
News, and members of the public sympathetic to Russia who write to 
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newspapers, to spread misinformation in a highly persuasive and credible 
way. In the present conflict in Eastern Ukraine, Russia has effectively used 
the information sphere as an integral tool in its hybrid war against the 
people of Ukraine” (Bachmann and Paphiti 2016: 37); “past experience 
in Ukraine and theory evaluation indicate that the new-generation war 
includes multi-level efforts aimed at destabilizing the state functions and 
changing the internal order. The information space will provide a range 
of opportunities to reduce the opponent’s potential, especially through 
the use of new technologies and information networking. A non-standard 
approach to the fight will be crucial in the new-generation wars” (Banasik 
2016: 177).
Against this background, the European community pays more and more 
attention to the issues of negative information’s influence in the context 
of contemporary hybrid war manifestations. The comprehensive analysis 
of the EU Strategic Communications with a View to Counteracting 
Propaganda (EP 2016), prepared by the European Union Institute for 
Security Studies and commissioned by the European Parliament, might 
serve as a relevant example here. Its authors emphasize that Russia and 
ISIL have been engaged in aggressive messaging and deceptive media 
campaigns, though using distinct narratives and aiming at different targets 
and audiences. Accordingly, the analysis draws attention to the strategic 
communications efforts undertaken by the EU, which are channelled 
into both defensive (react and respond) and offensive (probe and push) 
dimensions. Such understanding of the present context will hopefully 
allow an evaluation of what exact actions can be taken to improve the 
effectiveness of strategic communications within the EU itself (EP 2016).
Journalism-related crimes as the new form of 
criminality 
The information-related component of a hybrid war, as demonstrated 
above, is implemented under a wide range of vectors, the media being 
one of them. Mass media and social networks are used extensively for the 
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realization of political goals of the aggression which are usually achieved 
by regular war. Taking into account the necessity of preventing such 
hybrid war manifestations and effectively resisting them, there is a strong 
demand for the scientific exploration of journalistic work in the context of 
legal regulation.
The key concept of criminal law and criminology is the category of 
criminality. Today there is no doubt that criminality is a phenomenon 
attributable to any society. In its general form, it can be described as 
the commission of acts by a fraction of general public members that 
cause significant harm to a person, society, state or Commonwealth, thus 
constituting the most egregious type of human behaviour.
Legal features of criminality should be recognized as its important feature, 
and therefore crimes include only acts which are directly mentioned in 
criminal law and which can trigger penalties under this law. The theory of 
criminal law provides that, based on this feature, crimes are distinguished 
from other dangerous offences, particularly those that can potentially 
cause significant damage but are not identified as such in criminal law. 
Criminalization or decriminalization in law is the only legal means of 
changing the list of acts that are recognized as criminal.
As put by Yakov Gilinskiy, “criminality is a complex social phenomenon 
without ‘natural’ boundaries (as distinct from drug-addiction, drunkenness 
and suicide) and definable with the help of two multi-faceted criteria: 1) 
its danger or real harmfulness to society and 2) its designation in the penal 
code (nullum crimen sine lege) - there is no crime without its designation 
in the penal code” (Gilinskiy 2001: 74).
Criminality is extremely sensitive about social and political change and 
clearly reflects this. Changes in social relations under the influence of 
various factors (including the information component of hybrid war — the 
information war) can transform perceptions of criminality by affecting the 
emergence of new types of crime. As noted by Natalia Savinova, media 
space that is not regulated by law under conditions of an information 
society leads to a state of anomie in the latter: this is embodied in the 
change of social ideals and morals. When certain social groups no longer 
feel their involvement in the society, which brings about their exclusion, 
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new social norms and values are denied by members of these groups, 
including declared patterns of behaviour; at the same time, their own 
(particularly an illegal pattern of) behaviour is put forward as a means to 
achieve social and individual goals (Savinova 2013: 209).
Professional, economic, environmental, organized, corrupt, recidivist, 
unintentional and other types of criminality are traditionally distinguished. 
Such classification helps, first of all, to specify the study of many issues; 
secondly, it is important for meeting practical goals in combating crime 
in general and its individual variations in particular (Danshyn 2009). 
Nowadays, taking into account the intensification of informational 
technologies development as inherent in a globalized society, there 
are even more reasons to believe in the emergence of a new type of 
criminality - that is, journalism-related criminality.
Firstly, journalistic crime may be crimes committed against journalists 
and their professional activities. Generally, any democratic state at the 
appropriate legal level protects the legitimate professional activities of 
journalists and their life, health and property, which may be harmed in 
connection with the implementation of such activities. Different means 
- including, in some cases, criminal ones - can be used for this purpose. 
Ukraine is among those countries whose Criminal Codes provide for liability 
for interference with the legitimate professional activities of journalists 
(Article 171). Thus, the following acts are recognized as criminal: 1) 
illegal taking of materials and technical means, prepared by a journalist 
in connection with his professional activity; 2) illegal denial of access to 
information by a journalist; 3) illicit prohibition on coverage of certain topics, 
display of individuals, criticism of the public official; 4) any other intentional 
interference with the legitimate professional activity of the journalist, 5) any 
form of influence on the journalist in order to prevent him from executing 
his professional duties or prosecution of a journalist based on his legitimate 
professional activities. In addition, due to the need to establish additional 
security guarantees for the legitimate professional activities of journalists, 
special criminal law provisions on liability for attacks on journalists’ lives, 
health, freedom and property (Articles 345-1, 347-1, 348-1, 349-1 and part 
2 of Article 375 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine) were introduced in 2015. 
These acknowledge not only that journalists may become victims of these 
crimes, but so too may their close relatives and family members.
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Pavlykivskyi notes that, unlike in post-Soviet countries, the legislation of 
European countries and the United States does not contain criminal law 
prohibition of violations of journalists’ rights, which is, in his opinion, to some 
extent conditioned by the effectiveness of the regulatory norms in the 
area of ensuring freedom of speech and the activities of journalists in 
these countries. At the same time, the introduction of norms of criminal 
liability for interference with journalistic activities in Ukraine is broadly in 
line with the generally accepted principles of criminal law and principles 
of the criminalization of socially dangerous acts (Pavlykivskyi 2017: 6, 26).
Firstly, it is possible to concede that the legitimate professional activity 
of journalists gets protection at the highest legal level in Ukraine. The 
existing criminal law base is sufficient to protect journalists from almost all 
forms of influence, including obstruction of their activities. In recent years, 
there has been a trend towards expanding the range of criminalized 
acts connected with the obstruction of such activities, increasing the 
punishment for crimes against journalists and improving criminal legislation 
in this area. This does not exclude another component of the issue: the 
effectiveness of the relevant criminal law norms and the need to improve 
the mechanism of detection of this category of crimes, including their 
proof in court and a fair response to them from the state, because 
under the condition of Ukraine being in a state of hybrid war, the issue of 
exercising aggression against journalists is exacerbated. 
Secondly, journalism-related criminality refers to journalists who, under 
appropriate circumstances, may be recognized as crime perpetrators in the 
area of their professional activities. This component of journalistic criminality 
is of higher interest, since it is much less studied and organized while relevant 
data on it remain mostly unstructured. In addition, the issue of crimes against 
journalists — i.e. those associated with the violation of their rights — is primarily 
the focus of the global legal discourse. As for the improper performance 
of professional functions by journalists, their abuse and unlawful acts of 
behaviour in the area of information relations, so far there is no adequate 
understanding of this complex criminal law phenomenon.
When describing journalists as potential crime perpetrators, one should 
take into account that journalistic activity consists of two types of action: 
that related to obtaining information (as well as its separate or related 
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symptoms in the form of collection and creation) and that related to the 
usage of information (including its distribution and storage). There is no 
doubt that a journalist has the right to receive and use information in any 
way, except those prohibited by law and/or which violate the ethical 
principles of journalism. Some of these methods of unlawful procurement 
(use) of information by a journalist through their embodied high level of 
public danger can quite naturally create grounds for legal liability.
Therefore, it would make sense to divide all crimes that might be committed 
by a journalist in the course of his or her professional activities into the 
following two groups: 1) crimes committed when collecting, receiving and 
creating information; and 2) crimes committed when storing, distributing 
or otherwise using information.
The content of each of these groups will be further disclosed schematically. 
Based on the acts that are criminalized in Ukraine, subgroups of crimes 
that cover various forms of journalist violation of the legally regulated 
framework for collecting, receiving, creating, distributing, storing and 
otherwise using information will be pointed out. 
1. Crimes that can be committed by a journalist in the course of 
collecting, receiving and creating information under the Criminal 
Code of Ukraine 
These include:
1.1. Encroachment on the right to privacy: violation of home 
inviolability; violation of the secrecy of correspondence, 
telephone conversations, telegraph and other 
correspondence which is transmitted through means of 
communication or computer; violation of privacy.
1.2. Encroachment on the right to confidentiality: illegal gathering 
of information that constitutes commercial or banking 
secrecy with the purpose of using it.
1.3. Encroachment on the order of access to information: forgery 
of documents, seals, stamps and forms; sale or use of forged 
documents, seals, stamps; illegal use of special technical 
means to obtain information; unauthorized interference 
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in the operation of electronic calculating machines 
(computers), automated systems, computer networks or 
telecommunication networks; illegal use of the symbols of 
Red Cross, Red Crescent and Red Crystal.
All the crimes mentioned are united by the fact that they are committed 
by a journalist with the purpose of obtaining access to certain information 
or facilitating such access. For example, these include cases when a 
journalist forges a specific document which gives him the right to obtain 
information that interests him.
2. Crimes that can be committed by a journalist while storing, 
distributing or otherwise using information under the Criminal Code 
of Ukraine 
These include:
2.1. Interference with activities of a certain person or public body: 
interfering with activities of the law enforcement agent, state 
executive service employee; interference with activities of a 
statesman; interference with the judiciary; interference with 
activities of defence attorney or legal representative.
2.2. Disclosure or other use of a certain type of information: illegal 
disclosure of a medical secret; illegal use of information 
that constitutes a commercial or banking secret; disclosure 
of commercial or banking secrecy; illegal use of insider 
information.
2.3. Calls to commit crimes: public calls to commit a terrorist 
act; calls for actions that threaten public order; war 
propaganda; public calls for violent change or overthrow of 
the constitutional order or the seizure of state power; public 
calls for actions aimed at changing the territory or the state 
border of Ukraine.
2.4. Other violations associated with the use of information: treason; 
violation of citizenship equality based on race, nationality, 
religious beliefs, disability and other grounds; infringement 
of copyright and related rights; knowingly false report of a 
threat to the safety of citizens, destruction or damage of 
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property; importation, manufacture or distribution of works 
that propagandize violence and cruelty, racial, national or 
religious intolerance and discrimination; desecration of state 
symbols; propaganda of Communist and National Socialist 
(Nazi) totalitarian regimes, extortion.
Current law enforcement practice does not yield many examples where 
a journalist would be prosecuted for these types of crime. One reason for 
this is the reluctance of law enforcement officers to enter into conflict with 
media representatives, since any accusation of a journalist committing an 
offence may end with a reciprocal allegation of violation of freedom of 
speech (there is no doubt that criminal prosecution as such is capable of 
having a “cooling effect” on a journalist). Sometimes this is true, since law 
enforcement pressure on a journalist may be related to his activity in the 
absence of necessary grounds for it. In other cases, though, a prominent 
statement about violation of freedom of speech can be nothing more 
than a cover to justify a criminal act committed by a journalist.
In Ukraine, the most well-known examples are the case against Gerus 
(Ukrainska pravda 2005) and the case against Kotsaba (Ipress 2016). We 
start with the most recent: the case against Guzhva. According to the 
report of the Prosecutor General’s Office on 22 June 2017, the head of 
the internet resource Strana.UA and his accomplice were arrested on 
suspicion of extortion (Criminal Code of Ukraine Article 189: part 3). The 
pre-trial investigation revealed that the detained person (a journalist) 
demanded from the Member of Parliament of Ukraine money to the 
amount of $20,000 for not disclosing information about his personal life 
and political activities in the media (PGO 2017).
A promising direction for current scientific studies is related to the 
expediency of criminalization of certain acts committed by a journalist 
as a special actor of crime, particularly that related to the dissemination 
of deliberately false information. As correctly mentioned in the legal 
literature, 
“the newest challenge for those in crime control and prevention 
is to keep up with new innovations in crime and their impact. 
As well, policy makers must attempt to anticipate the risks and 
pitfalls that result from rapid change. This will require future 
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research activities encompassing the effects of globalization, 
demography and its trends, technology, economics and social 
and organizational structures amongst others. Investment in 
all such research activities can yield significant benefits for the 
reduction of crime and the development of crime control in the 
future. We all have a role to play in preventing crime. If anything 
can be learned from the past, it is that appropriate expenditure 
on crime prevention planning can be more cost effective than 
seeking to solve the problem after it has become entrenched” 
(Graycar 2001). 
Criminal law limits on the freedom of speech
One of the key issues arising in the context of journalistic crimes is the 
question of the line where freedom of expression ends and a certain 
criminal act begins. What limits should freedom of speech have in a 
democratic civilized society? Is it not true that establishing criminal liability 
for the commission of socially dangerous acts by a journalist in the course 
of his professional activities constitutes violation of freedom of speech?
The Ukrainian Constitution guarantees everyone the right to freedom of 
thought and speech, to free expression of one’s views and beliefs. The 
right to freely collect, store, use and disseminate information orally, in 
writing or by any other means is granted to every person based on their 
own choice (UP 1996).
The relevant constitutional provision establishes the common civilizational 
rule that is completely consistent with the principles produced by 
international practice and clearly enshrined in many international legal 
documents. 
At the same time, just like any other rule, it has a number of exceptions. 
We are talking here about the legally provided limitations on the exercise 
of freedom of speech. Indeed, exercise of the rights mentioned in Article 
34 of the Constitution of Ukraine can be restricted by law for the benefit 
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of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention 
of disorders or crimes, for the protection of public health, protection of 
reputation or rights of other people, for preventing disclosure of information 
received in confidence, or for maintaining authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary. In the furtherance of this provision, Ukrainian legislation (along 
with that of most other countries) rightly prohibits the dissemination of 
information, which includes, among other parts, calls for the commission 
of certain socially dangerous acts, which conflicts with public morality 
norms, includes confidential information and establishes a set of measures 
of legal influence on people who violate such prohibitions.
Restrictions on the rights of an individual to collect, store, use and 
disseminate information are also provided in Part 2 of Article 29 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, according to which “in the 
exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing 
due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of 
meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general 
welfare in a democratic society” (UDHR 1948).
Thus, the right to freedom of expression has certain limits in its 
implementation which are clearly defined at the level of legal regulations. 
Exercise of this right should be carried out in such a way that the rights, 
freedoms and lawful interests of other citizens and the rights and interests 
of legal entities should not be violated.
A special case of exercising the right to freedom of speech guaranteed 
by the Constitution of Ukraine is the professional activity of journalists. Such 
activity must have a lawful character. When collecting, creating and 
disseminating information, a journalist should act within the legally defined 
rules. He is obliged to adhere to the principles of information relations 
among which one should pay particular attention to the accuracy and 
completeness of information as well as the legitimacy of receipt, use, 
distribution, storage and protection (Article 5 of the Law of Ukraine on 
Information). These principles are an important foundation in the work of 
journalists on realizing the right to freedom of opinion and speech; they are 
designed to prevent abuse of this right and to the exclude the possibility 
of illegal and/or manipulative information influence.
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The aforementioned provision (to the principles of information relations), 
while having a general character is, however, of an imperative nature 
and imposes a duty on the journalist to use only true information in the 
course of his professional activity and not to abuse the rights given to 
him by the law. It is not accidental that breach of such principles by a 
journalist can form the basis for bringing him to legal (disciplinary, civil, 
administrative or criminal) liability.
Regarding the latter, the issue here is with the journalist committing the 
above mentioned offences related to unlawful means of receiving, using 
and disseminating information of certain content. In case of spreading 
false information — that is, fictional information (on events, things or facts 
that never occurred) or presented in a false manner (with distortion of 
information about certain events, occurrences or facts) — a journalist 
may be subjected for certain actions only to disciplinary liability or, in case 
of breach of civil rights and interests of a certain person, civil liability. A 
more severe form of legal liability for disseminating false information by a 
journalist is not prohibited by Ukrainian law.
The main question that arises in the absence of criminal liability for the 
dissemination of deliberately false information is related to the alleged 
contradiction between the criminalization of such actions and provisions 
on freedom of thought and speech under the Constitution of Ukraine and 
international legal acts. Realizing the complexity and ambiguity of the 
raised issue, I will try to assume the absence of such a contradiction. Part 1 
of Article 34 of the Constitution of Ukraine sets the general rule for freedom 
of opinion and expression. There are quite justified exceptions from this rule 
related to the abuse of this right. Indeed, one of them is directly provided 
in part 3 of Article 34 of the Constitution of Ukraine and is implemented 
in a number of criminal statutes. Another is reflected in international law 
provisions (the previously mentioned part 2 of Article 29 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948).
Therefore, there is reason to assert that dissemination by a journalist 
of deliberately false information does not contradict the mentioned 
constitutional and international legal provisions. Committing certain acts 
can naturally result in legal liability.
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Journalists as potential perpetrators of crimes 
related to dissemination of deliberately false 
information: issue outline
As previously established, the legitimacy of receipt, use, distribution, 
storage and protection is correctly recognized as one of the principles of 
information relations. Legal protection covers only such journalistic activity 
as is undertaken in accordance with statutory established requirements. 
However, illegal professional activities of journalists are not acceptable 
and, depending on the type of violation, require a proper response from 
both the socio-moral and legal aspects (i.e. within the implementation of 
all kinds of legal liability).1
At the same time, legal professionals are increasingly often addressing 
the fact that the current group of crimes that can be committed by a 
journalist in the course of his or her professional activity is not able to ensure 
the completeness of criminal law provisions in this area. After all, some 
acts of journalism conduct remain not punishable despite the inherent 
nature of their social danger. This is particularly the case with spreading 
deliberately false information by the mass media aimed at discrediting a 
natural person or entity in order to obtain illegal benefits (Busol 2015: 26), 
manipulating the consciousness of the population through media and 
information expansion (Savinova 2014: 111) and others. Some lawyers go 
even further, by offering to believe that there is a crime of “blatant lie, 
which causes serious harm”, regardless of whether or not the person who 
disseminates false information is a professional journalist. It is reasonably 
emphasized that “if the function of criminal law is to prevent harm by 
deterring individuals from engaging in certain forms of conduct, then our 
laws would be remiss to not make lying subject to criminal sanction in 
certain egregious cases” (Druzin and Li 2011: 572–573). 
In June of 2017, the head of the Security Service of Ukraine made a 
significant statement on the need to provide for an adequate legal 
1 International principles of professional ethics in journalism provide that “information in journalism is understood as a 
social good and not as a commodity, which means that journalist shares responsibility for the information transmitted 
and is thus accountable not only to those controlling the media but ultimately to the public at large, including various 
social interests” (EthicNet 2008).
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (80) - 2017
172
treatment for all forms and methods of hybrid war in the Criminal Code 
of Ukraine. In his opinion, the adequate response to an enemy requires 
absolute joint actions, the integration of law enforcement and the 
force of public opinion as a weapon against Russian aggression in the 
information space (SCU 2017). There is no doubt that the deliberate 
dissemination of false information by journalists can be considered one of 
the manifestations of the hybrid war.
How justified is it to pose the question in such a way?
The current legal approach to the dissemination of deliberately false 
information by using mass media cannot indeed be considered sufficient; 
such actions are capable of causing significant damage to areas of 
criminal law protection. One argument is that neither disciplinary nor 
civil liability for the dissemination of false information by a journalist, as 
opposed to a criminal, can serve as an effective safeguard against serious 
violations in the area of information relations.
Considering all of the above, the issue of such acts’ criminalization is quite 
interesting as a research perspective.
Any process of criminalization has to be conditioned by certain factors, 
among which the theory of criminal law names reasons, grounds and 
conditions of criminalization that should be applied systematically 
(Dudorov and Khavroniuk 2014: 65–67).
Having examined the likely range of reasons for criminalizing the 
dissemination of deliberately false information, one can prove the 
existence of at least two of them:
• The need to ensure the implementation of legal provisions that 
regulate the area of information relations (for instance, in Ukraine 
these are the laws on Information, on the Print Media (Press) in 
Ukraine and on Television and Radio) when determining journalists’ 
obligation to disseminate accurate and objective information.
• The dynamics and prevalence of the mentioned act. As experts 
convincingly argue, spreading false information in Ukraine 
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today is systemic, provided that there is still no effective measure 
of combating it (Savinova 2014: 100). Indeed, recent trends 
demonstrate that the abuse of rights by journalists, their deliberate 
use of false information that increasingly finds objective proof, has 
happened quite often. Against such a background, the issue of 
determining the mental approach of journalists to their own actions 
seems to be more complicated. Nevertheless, the nature of some 
information — its obvious and sometimes undeniable falsity — leads 
to the idea of high probability of intentional conduct.
The only reason for the criminalization of acts is in accordance with the 
appropriate level and nature of their social danger, which is characterized 
by the ability to cause significant damage to areas of criminal law 
protection (Dudorov and Khavroniuk 2014: 66).
With this in mind, dissemination of knowingly false information by a journalist, 
due to its nature, is first of all able in some cases to harm the interests of the 
society, the state, the commonwealth and even humanity. We are talking 
here about the intentional use of inaccurate data in mass media. Such 
actions can be committed in order to create a controlled impact on a 
particular group of people or humanity in general with a goal of inciting 
enmity and hatred, artificially creating a conflict situation or its escalation, 
and so on. As aptly noted by Ganna Yudkivska, a judge in the European 
Court of Human Rights, “false speech” can be no less dangerous than the 
classic “hate speech”. The falsification of facts, even without explicit calls 
for violence, easily creates an atmosphere of hatred. The question of how 
modern mechanisms of human rights protection provide an adequate 
response to these challenges remains unanswered. Obviously, under the 
circumstances of today’s media space, fake information is disseminated 
very easily (Yudkivska 2016) and therefore “open societies remain 
surprisingly susceptible to misinformation that instigates intimidation, 
discrimination and violence against vulnerable groups. Untruths doled out 
in hate campaigns find ready buyers even in a free marketplace of ideas” 
(Cherian 2016).
Modern Ukrainian practice covers some cases when a journalist uses 
inaccurate information, which ultimately leads to the breakdown 
of mobilization, disturbance of public order, spread of panic, loss of 
government or public institution authority, loss of business reputation and 
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so on. However, journalistic crimes do not recognize borders and become 
international, thus creating a global problem. According to Victoriya 
Romanyuk, deputy chief editor of the StopFake project,2 the methods 
used in Russian propaganda are universal and can be employed against 
any opponent and any country. In 2015, the developers of this project 
analysed numerous obviously false reports in the context of the conflicts in 
Syria and Turkey, which allowed them to openly comment on the trends 
and universal approaches of the Russian propaganda machine (GU 
2016). In Germany, the criminal case of Lisa F. attracted high publicity. 
On 16 January 2016, the Russian First Channel featured a story about 
a 13-year-old Russian-speaking resident of Berlin, Lisa, who had been 
allegedly kidnapped and raped by three men appearing to be migrants 
from the Middle East. The Berlin prosecutor’s office, after conducting an 
investigation, concluded that the girl had never been raped or abducted. 
After that, a criminal case was filed against a journalist of the First Channel, 
Ivan Blagoy, who filmed a fake report on the “raped” 13-year-old Russian-
speaking girl. Later, the criminal case against the journalist was closed 
due to a lack of evidence that Ivan Blagoy was aware that information 
about the commission of the crime was not true (DW 2016).
As for Ukraine, one of the most striking examples of coordinated media 
lies was the media report mentioning that Americans and Poles are 
fighting on the side of Ukrainian army. The fake topic of territorial claims 
on Ukraine from other neighbouring countries, including Poland, Romania 
and Hungary, has also intensified recently (GU 2016). Reports by Russian 
journalists on the crucifixion of a boy by Ukrainian soldiers in front of his 
mother and the supposed striking down of a Malaysian Boeing by a 
Ukrainian fighter in July 2014 have become almost textbook examples. 
Commenting on them, Taranenko correctly notes that during the 
coverage of Ukrainian news, journalists of the Russian media created 
false informational efforts aimed at exciting hatred towards the Ukrainian 
military and officials (Taranenko 2017).
One of the most dangerous facts is that the journalistic environment in 
Ukraine particularly has been influenced by the Russian special service. 
2 This project has been created by professional journalists in order to counter the information war in Ukraine and is 
aimed at exposing outright false information about Ukraine, which is disseminated in the media. Nowadays «StopFake» 
has gone beyond an investigative journalism project and has turned into an international analytical platform which 
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According to Roman Zaitsev, the executive director of Mirotvorets, the 
centre for the study of crimes against the national security of Ukraine, 
human security and international order, some Ukrainian media are used 
as instruments of propaganda in the hands of the enemy. They work 
directly or indirectly for the enemy, thus influencing the minds of Ukrainian 
citizens. However, he notes that the Ukrainian audience possesses much 
stronger immunity compared with the Russian (Faktyi 2016).
The discussed actions are also characterized by the creation of a real 
threat of causing substantial harm to public relations with regard to public 
order, public security, the authority of government agencies, the peace 
and security of humanity, and so on. We should not forget that the public 
danger of an act can vary under the influence of certain factors, hybrid 
warfare being one of them. Natalia Savinova’s position draws attention 
in this respect. She proves that such circumstances fully demonstrate 
the need to identify the fact that the issue of criminalizing such acts as 
manipulation of the population’s consciousness through the media 
and informational expansion has to be addressed as soon as possible 
(Savinova 2014: 111).
The criminalization of dissemination of deliberately false information 
complies with social and psychological features, according to which 
the act should be criminalized if such act is caused by its immorality 
or awareness of the population, based on the legal culture and sense 
of justice within the population. Almost all codes of ethics in journalism 
determine truthfulness and objectivity as the basis for professional virtues. 
According to experts on journalism ethics, a journalist must be sure of the 
veracity of the information he disseminates and be sure of the information 
source’s trustworthiness. Journalists must be particularly vigilant in order not 
to harm anybody by unveiling incomplete or inaccurate information. Wilful 
distortion of facts, their biased selection, disseminating false information or 
obtaining material incentives from third parties for a biased publication 
constitute a gross violation of ethical standards (Ivanov and Serdiuk 2007: 
135; Prystupenko 2008: 228–229; Vymětal et al. 2008).
As for the conditions of criminal law and the criminal procedural nature, 
then, first of all, the criminalization of dissemination by a journalist of 
deliberately false information has some ability to complicate the process 
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of criminal law analyses in the area of establishing intentional fault as an 
essential element of the crime’s mens rea and separating, based on this 
element, the instances of negligent dissemination of false information by 
a journalist. Secondly, the emergence of difficulties in proving the fact of 
committing such violation is quite possible, including proof of wilfulness when 
committing relevant acts. A striking example of this is the aforementioned 
criminal case of Lisa F., in which law enforcement agencies in Germany 
failed to prove the intention of disseminating inaccurate information 
by the journalist (unfortunately, the impossibility of proving this does not 
exclude the fact that the journalist could actually perceive the complete 
untrustworthiness of the disseminated information).
One of the perceived drawbacks of criminalization of the dissemination 
of knowingly false information by a journalist should be recognized as 
a currently existing threat of abuse by law enforcement agencies and 
by court of their positions when employing the discussed criminal law 
provision to pressure journalists, attack freedom of speech, and so on. 
Thus, all necessary grounds for criminalizing the dissemination of knowingly 
false information by journalists are present, but not all preconditions. 
Accordingly, such a criminalization, in case of its potential implementation, 
may become very risky. The mentioned risks are perceived, and I am not, 
therefore, a supporter of implementing this scenario. At the same time, 
this does not mean that counteracting journalists’ activities mentioned in 
this article is worthless. Obviously, this should be done in a way that does 
not involve a repressive character, which is inherent in criminal law.
Institutes of civil society, and the journalistic environment itself that has 
to demonstrate intolerance of malicious media practices, recognize and 
cover them, come to the foreground here. As for Ukraine, which remains 
in a state of hybrid war, it is equally important to formulate the appropriate 
information policy strategy at the state level, which would include a set 
of measures to detect fake news and its timely denial. In particular, the 
Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine has recently created the internet 
project Information Troops of Ukraine, the slogan of which is “Do not let 
yourself be fooled — spread the truth!” With this resource, anyone who 
wishes can contribute to the search and refutation of false information 
in the context of the Ukrainian-Russian confrontation. To date a lot of 
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relevant material has been accumulated on this web resource.
We should not exclude the expediency of application and other non-
standard methods of protecting the country’s information space, even 
though they can be perceived inconsistently. As the well-known Ukrainian 
researcher Horbulin rightly points out, in order to respond to hybrid 
aggression and protect its values, the state is forced to resort to the same 
grey methods of hybrid response. Unfortunately, very often those methods 
that the state should use to protect the values of society are contrary to 
the society’s ideas about the correct system of state, the correct reality 
and their interrelation with the values of this society itself. Therefore, Ukraine 
today applies a whole arsenal of methods that seem to be undemocratic 
or ambiguous to an outsider. The prohibition of Russian channels and 
Russian social networks is a hybrid response to a hybrid threat. Horbulin 
proposes the following example to this observation. After the 11 September 
2001 attacks, the Patriotic Act was enacted in the United States, a radical 
extension of the rights of intelligence and counterintelligence criticized 
by all human rights activists. The transformation of the United States into 
a dictatorship and the country of lost democratic freedoms has been 
drawn with vivid colours, especially by the Russian media. However, we still 
consider the United States one of the most demonstrative democracies, 
with a free political system. Having survived several transformations, this 
Act still exists, ensuring US security (Horbulin 2017b).
Conclusion
Modern manifestations of hybrid war serve as a powerful challenge 
for the countries that face them. One of the key features of hybridity is 
increasingly becoming the influence of negative information based on the 
implementation of mass media, the internet (including social networks) and 
other advanced computer technologies to achieve military and political 
objectives. The advantage of an informational and psychological impact 
on minds is becoming a prerequisite for the successful implementation of 
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One way of influencing negative information under the conditions of 
hybrid warfare is providing knowingly false information to the object of 
influence with the purpose of its disorientation. In Ukraine, such a method 
has gained wide application and was used long before the active phase 
of the military conflict. Media outlets have often been the source of 
misinformation with journalists being its carriers. Unfortunately, journalists 
are called to be true guarantors of the use of truthful information and to 
ensure the freedom of speech in any democratic society, and are able 
to use their status to the detriment of national and human security. The 
modern history of Ukrainian-Russian conflict convincingly proves this. It 
also clearly demonstrates the vulnerability of the state to the influence of 
active and aggressive information exercised in the course of professional 
journalism. Abuse of journalistic rights, a conscious disregard for the basic 
principles of information relations, violation of high ethical standards of 
journalism and legally regulated rules of receipt and use of information 
remain without legal response. 
At the same time, it must be emphasized that the outlined specificity 
of hybrid warfare determines a special approach to journalists who 
deliberately participate in it through the media. The position of the state 
and society in respect of journalistic activities under such conditions may 
differ substantially from that established in many democratic countries of 
the world, where journalists carry out their mission beyond the context of 
inter-state conflict relations. Under any circumstances, it is impossible to 
unequivocally identify a journalist as a bearer of an information weapon, 
since the majority of journalists continue to perform their work in good 
faith, even within hybrid and open confrontation. On the other hand, to 
pretend that the phenomenon does not exist would seem a big mistake.
This article raises the question of isolating a separate category of criminality, 
which it is proposed be called offences in the area of professional 
journalistic activities. Such a type of criminality should be considered a 
system of criminal acts where a journalist can be either a victim or an 
offender.
It has been proved that offences in the area of professional journalistic 
activities constitute a combination of intentional acts committed by 
and against a journalist and are also related to his activities surrounding 
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the collection, receipt, creation, dissemination, storage or other use of 
information. As a potential crime perpetrator, a journalist may be held 
criminally liable for the commission in the course of his professional 
activities of crimes related to: a) violation of the rules for collecting, 
receiving and creating information and b) distribution, storage and other 
use of information with certain content.
Instead, according to Ukrainian laws, under the conditions of information 
warfare, the criminal liability of a journalist is excluded for one of the 
most serious violations of professional journalistic activity, namely the 
dissemination of knowingly false information through mass media. 
Different aspects of the relevant question are discussed in the circle of 
expert lawyers. This article examines the possibility of establishing criminal 
liability for the commission of the said act, and concludes that despite 
the existence of reasons and grounds for its criminalization, it does 
not meet some of the conditions of criminalization (the issues of legal 
assessment and procedural proof of this type of behaviour), which in its 
complexity allows us to assert the inappropriateness of the adoption of 
such a legislative decision. Journalists’ resistance of the dissemination of 
knowingly false information should be resolute, alongside the development 
of an appropriate strategy that will involve the employment of anti-fake 
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